

## Homeric ἐπητής/ἐπητύς: Meaning and Etymology\*)

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### I. Introduction

At ν 332 Athene uses the word ἐπητής in her appraisal of Odysseus. She cannot desert him, she says, because he is ἐπητής and ἀγχίνοος and ἐχέφρων (330–332):

“αἰεὶ τοι τοιοῦτον ἐνὶ στήθεσσι νόημα·  
τῷ σε καὶ οὐ δύναμαι προλιπεῖν δύστηνον ἔοντα,  
οὐνεκ’ ἐπητής ἐσσι καὶ ἀγχίνοος καὶ ἐχέφρων.”

ἀγχίνοος and ἐχέφρων present no difficulties with respect to either derivation or meaning (apart from subtleties of interpretation); ἐπητής, on the other hand, was disputed in antiquity<sup>1</sup>) and remains still unresolved<sup>2</sup>).

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<sup>1</sup>) Schol. B, ν 332 (Dindorf 1855): ἐπήτης [v.l., ἐπητής], λόγιος. καὶ ὥσπερ ὁ λόγιος παρὰ τὸν λόγον, οὕτως καὶ ἐπήτης παρὰ τὸ ἔπος. τινὲς δὲ, δίκαιος, ὁ τὸ ἔτεδν φιλῶν. Schol. V: φρόνιμος καὶ λόγιος, παρὰ τὸ ἔπος. Schol. H: χωρὶς τοῦ τε, τῇ δὲ προσωδίᾳ ὡς ἀεικής, φησὶν Ἀρίσταρχος. οὕτω δὲ καὶ Ἡρωδιανός. ἐπήτης ἦγον λόγιος. καὶ ὡς ὁ λόγιος παρὰ τὸν λόγον, οὕτω καὶ ἐπήτης παρὰ τὸ ἔπος. Schol. BHQ, σ 128, ἐπητή: παρὰ τὸ ἔπος. περισπωμένως, ἀντὶ τοῦ λογίω. Schol. V: δεινῷ εἰπεῖν, ἢ λογίω, παρὰ τὰ ἔπη. Apoll. Lex. Hom. sv ἐπήτη: λογίω, παρὰ τὰ ἔπη. “ἐπήτη δ’ ἀνδρὶ ἔοικας”. ἐν δὲ τῷ φ τῆς Οδυσσεύς “οὐ γάρ τευ ἐπητύς ἀντεβόλησας”. Ἀρίσταρχος δὲ ἐπητέως διὰ δὲ τοῦ ε, καὶ λόγος ὑπόκειται τοιοῦτος· ἐπητέως οἶον εὐγνώμονος. τίθησι δὲ καὶ τὴν λέξιν ἐπίπαν ἐπὶ τοῦ συνετοῦ. “τοῦνεκ’ ἐπητής ἐσσι καὶ ἀγχίνοος καὶ ἐχέφρων”. καὶ οὐκ ἐπητύς. Hesych. sv ἐπητής: σώφρων. λόγιος. ἀληθής. δίκαιος. φρόνιμος. παρὰ τὰ ἔπη. πρῶτος. χρηστός; sv ἐπητές: αἷσιον; sv ἐπητέος: εὐλογίστου. εὐγνώμονος, συνετοῦ. πρῶτον. (See note 3 below.) Suda sv ἐπήτης: ὁ λόγιος καὶ συνετός. EM sv ἐπητής: παρὰ τὸ ἔπω, τὸ λέγω, γίνεται ἔπης· ἔδει γὰρ ἰσοσυλλαβεῖν τῷ ῥήματι· καὶ πλεονασμῷ τῆς τη συλλαβῆς, ἐπητής. Δηλοῖ δὲ οὐ μόνον τὸν τοῦ λέγειν δυνάμενον, ἀλλὰ καὶ τὸν τοῦ φρονεῖν ἐν δυνάμει ὄντα· ‘Οὐνεκ’ ἐπητής ἐσσι’. Ἀντὶ τοῦ, συνετός. Λέγεται καὶ ἐπητύς, θηλυκῶς, ὡς ἐδητύς ἐδητύος· οἶον, [‘οὐ γάρ τευ ἐπητύς ἀντιβολήσεις ἡμετέρῳ ἐνὶ δῆμῳ’. Ἀντὶ τοῦ ἐπαιτήσεως], συγγνώμης. Eust., Index sv ἐπητής: ὁ λόγιος καὶ φρόνιμος καὶ δεινὸς εἰπεῖν, παρὰ τὸ ἔπος, ἢ ὁ χαίρων τῇ ἀληθείᾳ, ἐκ τοῦ ἔτεδν καὶ τῆς ἐπὶ προθέσεως· καὶ ὅτι παρὰ μὲν τοῖς ἀρχαίοις βαρυτόνως ἐλέγετο, ὕστερον δὲ ὀξυτόνως.

<sup>2</sup>) E.g. Boisacq 1950 sv ἐπητής: ‘réfléchi? affable, bienveillant?’ ... “Étym. peu claire”; Frisk GEW sv ἐπητής: ‘besonnen, sich gut benehmend,

The second and final occurrence of *ἐπητής* in Homer is σ 128, where Odysseus uses the word of Amphinomos; the *nomen actionis* *ἐπητύς*<sup>3)</sup> appears at φ 306 in Antinoos' rebuke of Odysseus. The words are attested nowhere else in Greek literature with the exception of Apollonios Rhodios 2.987, *ἐπητής*, f.pl. and 3.1007, *ἐπήτεια* (a 'doublet' of *ἐπητύς*), pl.

The prevailing modern interpretation of *ἐπητής/ἐπητύς* is 'gentle, courteous'/'courtesy, kindness'<sup>4)</sup> (a sense that is not supported in the scholia to either Homer or Apollonios)<sup>5)</sup>. Hence Wackernagel,

wohlwollend' . . . "Nicht sicher erklärt"; Chantraine DELG *sv* *ἐπητής*: 'courtois, gentil, bienveillant, sage' . . . "Vieux terme obscur".

<sup>3)</sup> The ancient interpretations of *ἐπητύς* show somewhat less variety than is the case for *ἐπητής*, the connection with *ἔπος* being noticeably absent: Schol. V: *μεταίτησεως*; Eust., Index *sv* *ἐπητύς*: *ἐπητύος*, ἡ *μεταίτησις*, παρὰ τὸ *ἐπαιτεῖν*, ἢ ὁ ἐν λόγοις *ἔπαινος* παρὰ τὸ *ἔπος*, ὅθεν καὶ *ἐπητής* ὁ λόγιος; *Suda sv* *ἐπητύς*: τῇ *συνέσει*; Hesych. *sv* *ἐπητέος* (following Aristarchos, who took *τεν* as the object of *ἀντιβολήσεις* and read *ἐπητέος* [corrected from *ἐπητέως*] as an adjective in apposition to *τεν*): *εὐλογίστου. εὐγνώμονος, συνετοῦ. πρᾶον*.

<sup>4)</sup> LSJ<sup>9</sup> *sv* *ἐπητής, ἐπητύς*; cf. Chantraine DELG, Frisk GEW, Boisacq 1950, all *sv* *ἐπητής*; also Stanford 1958 II:211 (on ν 332) and 1963:31 and n11 (250).

<sup>5)</sup> For the scholia to Homer see note 1 above. Schol. Apoll. Rhod. 2.987, *ἐπητέες* (Wendel 1958): *λόγιοι, παρὰ τὸ ἔπος. ἢ οὐκ εὐγνώμονες καὶ προμηθεῖς, ἀλλὰ θρασεῖαι καὶ ἀπερίσκεπτοι*. Schol. Apoll. Rhod. 3.1007, *ἐπητείησιν: ἐπιστήμαις, φρονήσεσιν. καὶ Ὀμηρος* (σ 128) *ἐπητῇ δ' ἀνδρὶ ξοικας*. The interpretation of *ἐπητής* as 'gentle' is apparently based on *πρᾶος*, found only in Hesychios; the sense of 'courteous' presumably results either from an extension of Hesychios' *πρᾶος* or, perhaps more likely, from Aristarchos' *εὐγνώμων* (Apoll. *Lex. Hom. sv* *ἐπήτη*, continued by Hesychios *sv* *ἐπητέος*), understood in the sense of 'considerate of other people'. However, Aristarchos' *εὐγνώμων* has traditionally been interpreted as *prūdēns* (cf. van Leeuwen 1897:308(332). Hesych. *sv* *ἐπητέος* gives *συνετός* as a synonym of *εὐγνώμων*; cf. Apoll. *Lex. Hom. sv* *ἐπήτη*.) This interpretation of *εὐγνώμων* (as a gloss of *ἐπητής*) is supported by the scholion to Apoll. Rhod. 2.987, *ἐπητέες: οὐκ εὐγνώμονες καὶ προμηθεῖς, ἀλλὰ θρασεῖαι καὶ ἀπερίσκεπτοι*. While *εὐγνώμων* can have the meaning 'considerate of other people', the sense of 'prudent' for *εὐγνώμων* as well as *προμηθής* in the present context is vouchsafed by the juxtaposed antonyms *θρασύς* and *ἀπερίσκεπτος*. For the meaning of *ἀπερίσκεπτος* 'reckless, imprudent' see Thucydides 4.10, 4.108, 6.57, 6.65 et al.; the gloss of LSJ<sup>9</sup>, 'inconsiderate, thoughtless', is perhaps not sufficiently precise. 'Inconsiderate' can mean either 'unconsidered, rash' or 'without due regard for the rights or feelings of others'. In current usage the latter (ethical) sense predominates to the virtual exclusion of the former (pragmatic) sense. *ἀπερίσκεπτος* means 'inconsiderate' only in the (pragmatic) sense of 'unconsidered'. (The present paper is concerned only with the use of *ἐπητής/ἐπητύς* in Homer; I do not propose here to address the question of Apollonios' understanding of these words.)

who interprets ἐπητύς as 'freundlich ehrende Behandlung' and ἐπητής as 'sich gut benehmend', was led to suggest an etymology for ἐπητής/ἐπητύς consistent with such a meaning<sup>6</sup>): he derives ἐπητής/ἐπητύς from ἔπω (\*sep-), with root-cognates in Skt. *sápati*, *saparyáti* and Lat. *sepelire*. Wackernagel's proposal is today the leading candidate although it has by no means gained unqualified acceptance<sup>7</sup>).

The present paper addresses itself to the question: Is the interpretation upon which Wackernagel's etymology is based in fact compatible with Homer's use of these words, as indicated by an examination of the context in which they occur? Or, does the ancient connection with ἔπος yield a more satisfactory sense for ἐπητής/ἐπητύς in Homeric usage<sup>8</sup>)?

## II. ἐπητής

In Odysseus' speech to Amphinomos at σ 125ff., an association with *words* appears inherent in the use of ἐπητής. Odysseus here seems to equate the quality denoted by ἐπητής with that denoted by πεπνυμένος:

“Ἀμφίνομ’, ἧ μάλα μοι δοκέεις πεπνυμένος εἶναι.  
τοῖον γὰρ καὶ πατρός, ἐπεὶ κλέος ἐσθλὸν ἄκουον,

<sup>6</sup>) Wackernagel 1916:42n2.

<sup>7</sup>) Stanford 1958 II:211 (on ν 332) accepts Wackernagel's etymology (see further Stanford 1963:31 and n11 [250]); also Schwyzler 1939:506n9, and LSJ<sup>9</sup> *sv* ἐπητύς (tentatively). Chantraine DELG *sv* ἐπητής and Frisk GEW *sv* ἐπητής reserve judgment.

<sup>8</sup>) See the *Odyssey* scholia quoted in note 1 above. This interpretation has had its proponents too; its intuitive appeal (which has swayed a number of translators) is evidenced by Thornton 1970:83. However, if ἐπητύς in φ 306 is interpreted as 'eloquence', the resulting translation does violence to the sense of the line as a whole, e.g. Giguet 1857: 'Ton éloquence ne te servira plus dans Ithaque'. An alternative is to divorce ἐπητύς from ἐπητής, e.g. Lattimore 1967: 'well-spoken, fluent' / 'courtesy'. A way around this difficulty was attempted by LS<sup>7</sup>. While they indeed refer ἐπητής/ἐπητύς to ἔπος and gloss ἐπητύς as 'conversation', they qualify it as 'kind, friendly address or conversation' and then extend to 'courtesy, kindness' and so manage to have it both ways. In fact, their interpretation (cf. *sv* ἐπητής: 'conversable, sociable, gentle as opp. to rude and barbarous') would seem best epitomized by 'affability' (cf. Boisacq 1950 *sv* ἐπητής: 'affable', and for ἐπητύς, 'affabilité'). However, 'affability' denotes a *condition* or *disposition* (ἐξίς)—as do 'courtesy, kindness'—and such a notion cannot be conveyed in Homeric Greek by a -τύς noun. (Despite Benveniste 1948:65–74. I hope to discuss these problems in full detail elsewhere.)

*Νίσσον Δουλιχιῆα ἐὺν τ' ἔμεν ἀφνειὸν τε·  
τοῦ σ' ἔκ φασι γενέσθαι, ἐπητῇ δ' ἀνδρὶ ἔοικας."*

This brief father-son comparison opening Odysseus' speech is composed in ring-form<sup>9)</sup> (cf. the lengthier Tydeus-Diomedes comparisons of the *Iliad*, Δ 370–400 and *E* 800–813):

a	125	Amphinomos, you seem	πεπνυμένος	characteristic
b	126 <sup>a</sup>	Your father is like that		relationship
c	126 <sup>b</sup> –127	I have heard Nisos' fame		core
b'	128 <sup>a</sup>	You are his son		relationship
a'	128 <sup>b</sup>	And you seem ἐπητής		characteristic

The predicate terms in the opening and closing observations of a comparison in ring-form will parallel one another. That is, they will be synonymous (if not identical; cf. δ 204–206)<sup>10)</sup>. In the present passage πεπνυμένος and ἐπητής are thus to be considered synonymous and since πεπνυμένος manifestly implies proficiency in speech<sup>11)</sup> ἐπητής too ought to carry such an association<sup>12)</sup>.

<sup>9)</sup> The structure is remarkably similar to Athene's speech to Diomedes at *E* 800–813 (see Lohmann 1970:14).

<sup>10)</sup> All of the passages referred to here (Δ 370–400, *E* 800–813, σ 125–128, δ 204–206) are comparisons. Moreover, the comparisons do not take the form of single (isolated) assertions but are rather complexes of assertions, related as premise to conclusion. Common to all is the inference that either a particular relationship between two individuals depends on whether they share a characteristic or the sharing of a characteristic depends on whether two individuals have a particular relationship. In the Amphinomos passage a relationship between two individuals is presumed to allow the inference that they share a characteristic, given the additional premises that (a) one of the individuals actually possesses the characteristic and (b) the other seems to possess it. The comparison would have no point if the predicate term in premise and conclusion were not similar (synonymous) or identical.

<sup>11)</sup> The self-evident connection between wisdom and its expression in speech is borne out by Homeric usage: Of some 80 occurrences of πεπνυμένος in the *Iliad* and *Odyssey*, 73 (at least) are in a context in which πεπνυμένος is clearly applied (1) to a person who is actually speaking (or about to speak) or whose abilities as a speaker are being remarked upon; or, (2) to the speeches themselves, that is, to their *content*. (Even when allowance is made for repetition of formulae, the proportion is still overwhelming.) See especially Γ 148–151 πεπνυμένω ἄμφω . . . ἀγορηται ἐσθλοί; *I* 58–59 πεπνυμένα βάσεις . . . ἐπεὶ κατὰ μοῖραν ἔειπες; Σ 249–252 πεπνυμένος . . . μύθοισιν . . . ἐνίκα; δ 204–206 τόσα εἶπες ὅσ' ἂν πεπνυμένος ἀνὴρ / εἴποι . . . πεπνυμένα βάσεις; as an epithet of the speaker in formulaic lines introducing a speech: Γ 203, *N* 254, 266, Ψ 586, ω 375 and α 213, etc. (43 times of Telemachos); *H* 347, Σ 249, χ 461, α 367, ο 502; and of heralds: *H* 276, *I* 689, *H* 278, β 38, δ 696, 711, χ 361, ω 442. (Cf. Austin 1975:74–78.) For the etymology of πεπνυ-

When we turn to Athene's use of the word to characterize Odysseus (ν 332), we again find that a reading of the line in context supports an interpretation of ἐπητής which suggests a connection with ἔπος.

When Odysseus awakes on Ithaca, Athene appears to him as a shepherd boy. He asks what land; she tells him Ithaca. He responds with one of his Cretan tales, at which Athene smiles, caresses him and, revealing her identity, addresses him as 'σχέτλιε, ποικιλομήτα, δόλων ἄτ' (ν 293). She observes that he is best of all mortals at βουλή and μῦθοι, while she among all the gods is famed for μῆτις and κέρδεα (296–299). She reminds him that she is his constant help and protection in trouble and says that she has come to weave μῆτις with him (300–303). To all this Odysseus responds with charges of neglect and dissimulation (312–328), hardly the sort of behaviour, surely, to earn him the compliment of being 'gentle', 'courteous', 'well-behaved'. On the other hand, a man who can put a goddess on the defensive and make her offer excuses for her conduct toward him might well be said to have a remarkable proficiency with words—also a man who can fabricate such an elaborate biography for himself on a moment's notice as the Cretan tale which prompted his amused patroness to reveal herself.

Athene's response to Odysseus' extraordinary speech is a re-affirmation of her patronage and a justification for it as depending upon Odysseus' qualities of being ἐπητής, ἀγχίνοος and ἐχέφρων.

I suggest that the first two terms of this three-fold assessment repeat Athene's prior observation, that in fact ἀγχίνοος refers to preeminence in βουλή and ἐπητής to preeminence in μῦθοι<sup>13</sup>), while the third term, ἐχέφρων, is explained in the lines immediately following: 'Another man would have rushed off home but you are more careful . . .'<sup>14</sup>): being ἐχέφρων means being cautious and restrained.

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μένος see Szemerényi 1964:56–78: πεπνυμένος—along with πινυτός and πινυτή—is derived from an original \*pu-nu- (\*peu-/ \*pu-) with the meaning 'investigate' and so 'be experienced, wise'. (An original sense of 'investigate' would lend particular point to πεπνυμένος as Telemachos' principal epithet.)

<sup>12</sup>) Cf. the gloss of Schol. V *ad loc.*: δεινῶ εἰπεῖν (= Eust. 1841.19). For Amphinomos' pleasing (and efficacious) μῦθοι see (in addition to the passage at hand) π 398, 406, σ 422, ν 247.

<sup>13</sup>) The link between πεπνυμένος and ἄριστος μύθοισιν is precisely ἐπητής in the sense of 'extraordinarily proficient in speech'—whether the occasion calls for diplomacy or deceit, oratory or cajolery.

<sup>14</sup>) Erbse 1972:158ff. rightly defends the retention of these lines (ν 333–338), which have been questioned since the time of Aristarchos.

Indeed, all of Athene's observations in this pivotal scene can be correlated. She says here that he is *ἐχέφρων* and *ἀγχίνοος* and *ἐπητής*; earlier she had said that he is *ἄριστος βουλῇ καὶ μύθοισιν* (while of herself she said *κλέομαι μήτι καὶ κέρδεσιν*); and earlier still she had addressed him as *σχέτλιε, ποικιλομήτα, δόλων ἄτ'*. That is, *βουλῇ* and *μήτι* respond to *ποικιλομήτα* and anticipate *ἀγχίνοος*; *μύθοισιν* and *κέρδεσιν* respond to *δόλων ἄτ'* and anticipate *ἐπητής*; and *σχέτλιε* expresses the 'negative' aspect, the other side of the coin, so to speak, of the 'positive' term *ἐχέφρων*. The correspondences may be schematized as follows<sup>15</sup>):

Thus, throughout this scene, Athene is concerned solely with identifying those qualities of Odysseus (and of herself) which are the mark of pragmatic intelligence (with clear emphasis on the importance of *μῦθοι*); she shows no interest whatsoever in matters of social ethics, as the translations 'gentle', 'courteous', 'well-behaved' would imply.

### III. ἐπητός

When, at the Archery Contest, Odysseus in his beggar's disguise asks to try the bow, his request earns him a severe rebuke from Antinoos, culminating in a threat (φ 288–310):

“ἄ δειλὲ ξείνων, ἐνι τοι φρένες οὐδ' ἥβαιαί·  
οὐκ ἀγαπᾷς δ' ἔκηλος ὑπερφιάλοισι μεθ' ἡμῶν  
δαίνυσθαι, οὐδέ τι δαιτὸς ἀμέρδεται, αὐτὰρ ἀκούεις  
μύθων ἡμετέρων καὶ ῥήσιος; οὐδέ τις ἄλλος  
ἡμετέρων μύθων ξεῖνός καὶ πτωχὸς ἀκούει.  
οἶνός σε τρώει μελιγδής, ὃς τε καὶ ἄλλους  
βλάπτει, ὃς ἂν μιν χανδὸν ἔλῃ μηδ' αἴσιμα πίνῃ.  
οἶνος καὶ Κένταυρον, ἀγακλυτὸν Εὐρυτίωνα,  
ἅσ' ἐνὶ μεγάρῳ μεγαθύμον Πειριθόοιο,  
ἐς Λαπίθας ἐλθόνθ'· ὃ δ' ἐπεὶ φρένας ἄσεν οἶνω,

<sup>15</sup> The general association between all the terms in a column is emphasized by the close association between the interlinking pairs: *ποικιλομήτα/μήτι*, *βουλῇ/ἀγχίνοος*; *δόλων ἄτ'/κέρδεσιν*, *μύθοισιν/ἐπητής*.

μαινόμενος κάκ' ἔρεξε δόμον κάτα Πειριθόοιο·  
 ἦρωας δ' ἄχος εἶλε, διέκ προθύρον δὲ θύραζε  
 ἔλκον ἀναΐξαντες, ἀπ' οὔατα νηλέϊ χαλκῷ  
 ῥῖνάς τ' ἀμήσαντες· ὁ δὲ φρεσὶν ἦσιν ἀασθεῖς  
 ἦϊεν ἦν ἄτην ὀχέων ἀεσίφροني θυμῷ.  
 ἐξ οὗ Κενταύροισι καὶ ἀνδράσι νεῖκος ἐτύχθη,  
 οἷ δ' αὐτῷ πρώτῳ κακὸν εὔρετο οἰνοβαρείων,  
 ὧς καὶ σοὶ μέγα πῆμα πιφάυσκομαι, αἶ κε τὸ τόξον  
 ἐντανύσης· οὐ γάρ τευ ἐπητύος ἀντιβολήσεις  
 ἡμετέρῳ ἐνὶ δῆμῳ, ἄφαρ δέ σε νηὶ μελαίνῃ  
 εἰς Ἑχέτον βασιλῆα, βροτῶν δηλήμονα πάντων,  
 πέμφομεν· ἔνθεν δ' οὐ τι σαώσεται· ἀλλὰ ἔκηλος  
 πῖνέ τε, μηδ' ἐρίδαινε μετ' ἀνδράσι κουροτέροισι."

This speech takes the classic form of a *paradeigma* intended to influence the hearer toward or away from some proposed course of action (cf. *A* 259–274, *I* 529–549, *Ω* 599–620, etc.). The mythological example is here flanked by parallel rebuke and threat, the parallelism emphasized by the repetition of *ἐκηλος* (289 and 309):

- |                         |   |                                                                                                          |
|-------------------------|---|----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|
| a 288–289               | { | Ah, wretched stranger, there's not a bit of sense in you!                                                |
|                         | { | Have you no regard for the fact that you feast in peace among us arrogant men <sup>16</sup> ),           |
|                         | { | And you are not deprived of any part of the banquet <sup>17</sup> ),                                     |
| b 290–292               | { | But you listen to what we say and our conversation. There's no other stranger and beggar hears our talk! |
| c 293 <sup>a</sup>      | { | It's the wine that wounds you, the honey-sweet wine;                                                     |
|                         | { | It harms others too—whoever gulps it down and does not drink in due measure.                             |
| d 293 <sup>b</sup> –304 | { | Wine even the Centaur . . .                                                                              |
| c' 305                  | { | So also great trouble for you I announce, if you string the bow,                                         |

<sup>16</sup>) A privilege accorded him for his victory over Iros: σ 48f.

<sup>17</sup>) The part in question is the conversation, the talk after the meal—as song and lyre are ἀναθήματα of a δαίς (φ 430).

- |                          |   |                                                                                                                                                      |
|--------------------------|---|------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|
|                          | { | For you will not meet with any <sup>18)</sup> ἐπητύς among our group,                                                                                |
| b' 306–309 <sup>b</sup>  |   | But we will send you away at once in a black ship To King Echetos, the bane of all mortal men. From that moment on <sup>19)</sup> you won't be safe! |
| a' 309 <sup>c</sup> –310 |   | But instead go on drinking in peace And refrain from quarrelling with young men.                                                                     |

In Antinoos' opening rebuke, what is emphasized is that the Stranger, although an outsider and a beggar, has been made privy to the Suitors' *talk* (μῦθοι, ῥῆσις). The threat is that, if he offends them by stringing the bow, he will be denied ἐπητύς and indeed cast off the island entirely<sup>20)</sup>. The threatened penalty (withholding of ἐπητύς) corresponds to (and reverses) the previous reward (access to their μῦθοι and ῥῆσις). Formerly admitted to their company and to their conversation, the Stranger is now to be denied all spoken intercourse and indeed physically removed from their company: he is, in short, to be made an outcast<sup>21)</sup>.

ἐπητύς thus appears to refer to conversation or talk *per se*, with no connotation of proficiency such as we observed in the case of ἐπητήης. I propose, therefore, that we are dealing with a semantically neutral *nomen actionis* in -τυχς versus a semantically charged *nomen agentis* in -της: ἐπητύς denotes the mere act of speaking, while ἐπητήης designates a person of exceptional proficiency in ἐπητύς, the semantic extension in the *nomen agentis* finding a parallel in ἀγορευτής, which also always has complimentary connotations, and

<sup>18)</sup> I take *τεν* adjectively, with Stanford 1958 *ad loc.*; it has traditionally been taken substantively, e.g. Ameis-Hentze 1877 *ad loc.* (Cf. the debate over *τεν ἀγγελίης*, N 252.)

<sup>19)</sup> I take *ἐνθεν* to mean 'From the moment you string the bow'.

<sup>20)</sup> The reference to Echetos is merely incidental; the real threat is the sending away, that is, casting out (cf. v 382–383 and Stanford 1958 *ad loc.*). (308 is in fact omitted in some mss. and may indeed be an interpolation from σ 85). The anticipated provocation and threatened reprisal are neatly indicated by the emphatically positioned verbs *ἐνταύσης* (306) and *πέμψομεν* (309).

<sup>21)</sup> For the practice of denying an outcast verbal intercourse see, for example, Oedipus' imprecation to his people concerning the killer of Laius (Soph. *OT* 237f.), "shut out that man—no matter who—both from your shelter and *all spoken words* . . ." (Gould 1970, my italics). In his note *ad loc.* Gould cites *Orestes* 46ff., "the Argives declare that Orestes and Electra . . . must not be given shelter or *spoken to* (my italics).



is frequently found in combination with the epithet λιγύς, while ἀγορητύς carries no positive charge<sup>22</sup>).

#### IV. Etymology of ἐπητής/ἐπητύς

On the evidence from contextual analysis, then, derivation of ἐπητής/ἐπητύς from ἔπω (\*sep-)<sup>23</sup> would appear to be untenable on semantic grounds. On formal grounds, the absence of the *spiritus asper* is a difficulty. The coexistence in Homer of exclusively nonpsilotic forms of the verb proper (e.g. ἔποντα, Z 321, cf. ἐφάπεω, μεθέπεω) alongside of exclusively psilotic derivatives ἐπητής, ἐπητύς, lacks both plausible motivation and convincing explanation<sup>24</sup>).

There remains the possibility of derivation from the root \*sek<sup>w</sup>- 'to speak', etc. (Pokorny 1959:896–7)<sup>25</sup>. But since nothing is gained by this alternative while the problem of psilosis remains—and since \*sek<sup>w</sup>- in the sense of 'speak' is attested in Greek only in forms of the compound ἐν(ν)έπω—it may be rejected as a viable candidate.

In view of all these considerations it would appear advisable to retain the connection with ἔπος proposed in the scholia<sup>26</sup> and derive ἐπητής/ἐπητύς from the verbal root (F)επ- (cf. εἶπον, Skt. *āvocam*), with η-extension as in ἐδητύς from ἐδ- (cf. ἔδμεναι)<sup>27</sup>).

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<sup>22</sup>) Pace Benveniste 1948:66. ἀγορητόν in θ 168, like φνήν and φρένας with which it is linked in the same line, is to be construed as accusative of respect to χαρίεντα. (Cf. A 115, η 210, θ 134, etc. For the -της/-τυς contrast cf. also ἀκοντιστής, Π 328 and σ 262 vs. ἀκοντιστής, Ψ 622.)

<sup>23</sup>) See above, page 207 and note 7.

<sup>24</sup>) Cf. such regularly aspirate (extra-Homeric) derivatives of ἔπομαι (\*sek<sup>w</sup>-) as, e.g. ἐπέτᾱς (Pind. P. 5.4), ἐπέτις (Apoll. Rhod. 3.666).

<sup>25</sup>) For the semantics of IE \*sek<sup>w</sup>- see Baldi 1974.

<sup>26</sup>) See note 1 above.

<sup>27</sup>) As Wackernagel 1916:42n2 observed, ἐδητύς must have been the model for the replacement of \*ἐπτύς/\*ἐπητής (cf. γραπύς) by attested ἐπητύς/ἐπητής.

Cf. further Benveniste 1964:30 and on these formations in Homer generally Risch 1974:40–41.

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## Remarques sur χαίρων ἔθι et les formules apparentées\*)

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On sait que les auteurs grecs, et singulièrement les auteurs dramatiques, jouent parfois sur les formules de salutation, en donnant leur sens propre aux termes de "joie" ou de "bien-être" qui y figurent<sup>1</sup>). Le procédé se rencontre surtout chez Euripide, comme

\*) Je remercie A. Köhnken (Université de Bonn) pour les références et les remarques qu'il m'a communiquées après lecture d'une première version de ce travail.

<sup>1</sup>) La réinterprétation de la formule joue également un rôle dans la tradition philosophique à partir de Platon (*Charmide*, 164e), ainsi que chez les